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Abstract: This paper discusses the formation of the Federation of Malaysia 
and the Indonesian objection to it from the perspective of the bipolar 
international system. The confrontation policy launched by Indonesia in 
September 1963 ended in April 1967 when Suharto became president. Why 
did the policy and bilateral relation change after the fall of Sukarno? We 
assess that the systemic factor strongly influenced the Indonesian policy 
towards Malaysia. The bilateral relations between the two countries shifted 
after April 1967 as a result of the changes that took place in Indonesian 
domestic politics. Western powers, especially the United States, had 
supported Suharto’s ascension to power, with the purpose of avoiding the 
formation of a communist state in the region. This paper demonstrates that 
the systemic structure has strongly influenced the Indonesian policy 
towards Malaysia. The changes in the domestic politics of Indonesia could 
be considered a part of the United States’ strategy of blocking communism 
from spreading in Southeast Asia. 
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This paper discusses the formation of the Federation of Malaysia on 
the 16th of September 1963 and the Malaysia-Indonesia confrontation 
policy from perspective of the bipolar international system. The bipolar 
structure of the Cold War is important in understanding the relations 
between Indonesia and Malaysia during the 1960s.  
Why did Indonesia disagree with the formation of Malaysian 
federation and launched a policy of confrontation over the new state in 
September 1963? Culturally, Malaysia and Indonesia are very similar in 
terms of religion and language. Both have majority Muslim population 
speaking a generally similar Malay language. The cultural and linguistic 
similarities have influenced their bilateral relations during the 1960s. In 
discussing this issue, we shall relate to the systemic factor. In this case, 
however, we point out that religion, language and culture played a minimal 
role in influencing the bilateral relations.  
The confrontation policy launched by Indonesia (under President 
Sukarno) in September 1963 (when Tunku Abdul Rahman declared the 
formation of the new federation on September 16th 1963) ended in April 
1967 with the emergence of the "new order" in Indonesia, a pro-West 
administration under President Suharto. However, this aspect cannot be 
explained without referring to the changes occurring at domestic level, 
which were also linked to the relations and power configuration among the 
two world powers (the United States and the Soviet Union). The US-Soviet 
Union relation is therefore important in explaining domestic political 




development in Indonesia, since Suharto’s new order is largely influenced 
by it. 
 The discussion in this article is divided in eight parts:  theoretical 
framework - Structural Realism and Bipolar Structure, The Formation of 
the Federation of Malaysia and the Bipolar Structure, the Indonesian 
hostility towards the formation of a Malaysian state, bilateral relations after 
the fall of President Sukarno, the Indonesian Coup of 1965 interpreted by 
means of the bipolar structure, the relationship between the systemic and 
domestic factors and conclusions. 
 
Theoretical Framework: Structural Realism and Bipolar Structure. 
 
The discussion in this study is based on the structural realism 
ideology and the Cold War’s bipolar structure. Structural realism is 
concentrated on the existence of a system and not on the human factor in 
creating the system.1 Furthermore, the international political structure plays 
a crucial role in analyzing and understanding international relations and 
decision-making processes.2   
Structural realism differs from both classical and neoclassical 
realism. Classical realism focuses on state leaders and their subjective 
valuation of international relations, while neoclassical realism rejects the 
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idea that the systemic (international structure) level is the only level of 
analysis needed in studying international relations. From the neoclassical 
realist perspective, international relations and foreign policy analysis 
includes systemic, internal and also an individual level of analysis.3 The 
neoclassical realism argument can work in the case of strong and stable 
states, while becoming questionable for the weak and unstable ones, as is 
the case of third world countries like Malaysia and Indonesia during the 
Cold War. We assess that structural realism is more accurate in their case.  
During the Cold War, the systemic factor and the role of the United 
States and Soviet Union had a great impact on third world leaders, as they 
did not have many options in terms of foreign-policy.4 They had to choose 
whether to become a satellite state of the Soviet Union or lean towards the 
West.5 The international arena therefore played an important role in 
determining the course of action of the leaders of small and weak states 
during that period.  
 
The Formation of the Federation of Malaysia and the Bipolar 
Structure 
 
The formation of Federation of Malaysia on September 16th, 1963 
was closely related to the political development within South East Asian of 
                                                          
3 Jalal Dehghani Firoozabadi & Mojtaba Zare Ashkezari, “Neo-classical Realism in 
International Relations,” Asian Social Science, vol. 12, no. 6, 2016, pp. 95-99. 
4 Yuen Foong Khong, ”The United States and East Asia: Challenges to The Balance of 
Power,” in Ngaire Woods, (ed.), Explaining International Relations since 1945, Oxford, 
UK: Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 179.  
5 Robert Jackson, & Georg Sorensen, Introduction to International Relations, Oxford, UK, 
Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 84-85.  




the bipolar structure, which had a couple of similarities to the political 
development and the Soviet Union’s expansion in Europe during the late 
1940s.6 The Communist movement in Singapore in the early 1960s gave 
rise to the idea of merging the Republic of Singapore and Federation of 
Malaya as one unit of political administration. This decision was also 
sanctioned by Great Britain. The main objective was to save and secure 
Singapore from becoming a communist state. The Socialist Front (Barisan 
Sosialis), a leftist political party, gained very strong support from 
Singaporean mass population in the early 1960s. In April 1961, in the Hong 
Lim by-election a left wing candidate (pro-communists) won the election 
with a large majority vote. The People’s Action Party (PAP) candidate had 
only obtained 2,820 votes while the left-wing candidate got 7,747 votes.7 
Therefore the People’s Action Party (PAP) had an unstable position and 
uncertain future in the government.  The Hong Lim result showed how the 
left-wing (pro-China Communists) could gain political power in Singapore 
through the general election process. By merging Singapore with 
Federation of Malaya, PAP’s political position would be stronger, making it 
impossible for communist groups to control Singapore’s politics.8 
                                                          
6 John Subritzky,  Confronting Sukarno: British, American, Australian and New Zealand 
Diplomacy in the Malaysian-Indonesian Confrontation, 1961-65, London, Macmillan 
Press Ltd, 2000, p. 12. 
7 John B. Dalton, “The Development of Malayan External Policy, 1957-1963,” 
(Unpublished Ph.D Thesis, University of Oxford, England 1967), p. 313.  
8 Mohd. Noor Mat Yazid, Hegemonic Powers, Radical Politics & Developmental State: 
The Case of Indonesia-Malaysia Political Relations during The Cold War, Kota Kinabalu, 
Penerbit  Universiti Malaysia Sabah,2007,  pp. 199-202; Lee Kuan Yew, The Singapore 
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Tunku Abdul Rahman, prime minister of the Federation of Malaysia 
disagreed with the idea of merging the two countries because the ethnic 
Chinese would have become the majority population in the new federation, 
undermining the position of Malay politics. The prime-minister only 
accepted to merge the two countries if Great Britain would agree to free all 
of their colonies in the Borneo Island (British North Borneo, Sarawak and 
Brunei).9  Due to the very tense situation in the early 1960s, Great Britain 
agreed to the idea and the colonies became independent. The expansion of 
the Communist ideology in East Asia starting with 1949 was closely related 
to the British decision of freeing the colonies. In the early 1960s, the Soviet 
Union had a strong influence in Vietnam under Ho Chi Minh. Nevertheless, 
the chances of expanding the Soviet Union’s influence in the region 
increased.10 Similar to Vietnam, Indonesia was also influenced by the 
communists in the early 1960s. The position of Indonesian Communists 
under Aidit, Lokman and Nyoto became stronger in the Sukarno 
government since late 1950s.11   
The formation of Federation of Malaysia on 16 September 1963 was 
closely related to the international and regional political development 
within the bipolar structure of the North East and South East Asian regions. 
                                                          
9 John B. Dalton, “The Development of Malayan External Policy, 1957-1963,” p. 310. 
10 Yuen Foong Khong, “The United States and East Asia: Challenges to The Balance of 
Power,” in Ngaire Woods, (ed.), Explaining International Relations since 1945, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 190. 
11 Mohd. Noor Mat Yazid, Indonesia-Malaysia Political Relations, 1961-1976, 
Saarbrucken, Germany,Lambert Academic Publishing, 2014, see Chapter Two, especially 
pp. 19-21.  




The creation of a Communist China under Mao Tse-tung in October 1949 
and the Korean War 1950-1953 strongly influenced the American strategy 
toward communist states in Asia.12 Without American involvement in the 
area, the possibility that the free non-communists states would fall under 
communism was still considerable. 
 
The Indonesian hostility towards the formation of a Malaysian 
Federation  
 
In the early 1960s, the communists were very strong within the 
Indonesian government. Although, President Sukarno was not a communist, 
the alliance with PKI after 1956 contributed to the stronger position of the 
communists.13 External support from both China and Soviet Union for the 
Indonesian Communist Party also led to the rise of the Indonesian 
Communist Party or Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) in the late 1950s and 
early 1960s.14  The formation of the Malaysian federation was therefore 
jeopardized. The communists’ strategy was to control Singapore’s politics 
by transforming it in a communist state (the South-East Asian Cuba, as they 
called it).  With the formation of a Malaysian Federation, Singapore would 
                                                          
12 Yuen Foong Khong, “The United States and East Asia: Challenges to the Balance of 
Power,” pp. 184-185. 
13 Donald Hindley, “President Sukarno and the Communists: The Politics of 
Domestication,” The American Political Science Review, vol. LVI,  no. 4, 1962,  pp. 916-
917. 
14 Alexander Nadesan, “Sino-Indonesian Relations (1950-1967) and Its Future,” Indian 
Journal of Politics, April-August 1979, pp. 20-36. 





have been a failed plan of the communists. If the Socialist Front won a 
large majority in the Singapore General Elections, the creation of a pro-
Communist government in Singapore would have become impossible 
(because the anti-communist political party was very strong in Federation 
of Malaysia). 15 
 As a result, Mao’s idea of having only four great powers in Asia 
(i.e. China, Japan, Indonesia and India) could not be implemented, a fact 
that became clearer and clearer with the formation of the Federation of 
Malaysia on 16 September 1963. For him, “Greater Indonesia” (or 
Indonesia Raya) included the Malaysian peninsula, parts of Thailand, the 
whole Borneo Island and parts of the Philippines.16 The communists 
decided to destroy the newly-created state, Malaysia, as it represented an 
obstacle for their strategy in the region. The policy of confrontation 
(Ganyang Malaysia) with Malaysia began on 16 September 1963. 
 
The bilateral relations of Malaysia and Indonesia after the fall of 
Sukarno 
 
The Policy of Confrontation and the bilateral relations between 
Indonesia and Malaysia changed dramatically after the fall of President 
                                                          
15 Muhammad Muda, “Malaysia’s Foreign Policy and the Commonwealth,” The Round 
Table, no. 320, October 1991, pp. 455-457. 
16 Mohd. Noor Mat Yazid, Hegemonic Powers, Radical Politics & Developmental State: 
The Case of Indonesia-Malaysia Political Relations during The Cold War, Kota Kinabalu, 
Penerbit  Universiti Malaysia Sabah, 2007  pp. 227-228. 




Sukarno in September 1965.17 After the coup of 1965, Indonesian politics 
was controlled by the Suharto and the “New Order” doctrine. Sukarno’s 
influence was dramatically replaced by the anti-communist political 
group.18 The bilateral relations changed from being confrontational under 
Sukarno to being harmonious during President Suharto’s administration. 
Suharto’s policy was definitely a pro-Western one. The Indonesian 
diplomatic relations with democratic-capitalist countries rapidly improved 
under Suharto’s administration.19 Foreign investments and trade with 
Western countries were also strongly encouraged by the ‘New Order’.20  At 
the same time, relations with communist countries were banned. 
The formation of the federation of Malaysia could be considered 
one of the Western international security projects in South-East Asian 
region. Malaysia’s main objective was to strengthen the position of 
democratic political parties (PAP in Singapore and the Alliance political 
party in Malaysia) while decreasing the influence of the communist group 
(Socialist Front in Singapore and Malaysian Communist Party). The new 
federation (Federation of Malaysia) gained the support of Great Britain, US 
and the other Western powers. 
                                                          
17 Mohd Noor Mat Yazid, “Economic Development, Hegemonic Powers and Indonesia-
Malaysia Political Relations,” (Unpublished Ph.D thesis, School of Social Sciences, The 
University of Birmingham, England, October 2004), p. 300. 
18 Ibidem, p. 300. 
19 Usha Mahajani, “Indonesia’s New Order and The Diplomacy of Aid,” The Australian 
Outlook, vol. 21, no. 2, 1967, pp. 214-234. 
20 Richard Stubbs, “Canada’s Relations with Malaysia: Packing Partners in ASEAN,” 
Pacific Affairs, vol. 63, no. 3, Fall 1990, p. 355. 
 





Under the rule of Tunku Abdul Rahman (and then replaced by Tun 
Abdul Razak Husein) Malaysia was dominated by anti-communist groups. 
Under Suharto, Indonesia also had a similar political philosophy. This 
become the main incentive of creating better diplomatic relations between 
the two countries after 1965. Furthermore, with the strong support of the 
pro-Western groups in Indonesia and Malaysia, South-East Asia started 
paving their way towards democracy.  
 
The Indonesian Coup of 1965. An interpretation by means of the 
bipolar structure 
 
The Indonesian Coup on the 30th of September 1965 was an 
important turning point of Indonesian politics. The coup is important in 
explaining the process of political changes and the fall of communist 
ideology in Indonesia. The Indonesian Coup of 1965 could be interpreted 
from various angles, but for the sake of the argument, it will be interpreted 
as the United States’ strategy in overcoming the communists’ influence in 
Indonesia. After the coup, the domestic politics of Indonesia changed 
dramatically. Some authors see the incident as a communist act aimed at 
gaining influence in Indonesia. In analyzing the Indonesia-Malaysia 
confrontation and the Indonesian Coup of September 1965, we have to 
relate the incident to the international and regional political structure.   
From the perspective of the bipolar system and the West’s struggle 
for power, Suharto (and the anti-communists group) and the United States 
were responsible for the event, as they were trying to avoid the 




development of a communist Indonesia21. During the mid-1960s, the 
position of the communists under Chairman Aidit was very strong in 
Indonesian politics. South-East Asia was clearly divided by two poles of 
power. Indochina, especially North Vietnam, was controlled by the 
communist under Ho Chi Minh. The position of South Vietnam wasn’t 
secured and the Americans were not so confident in protecting South 
Vietnam. As a result South Vietnam would later lean towards the 
communist spectrum.  
 Similarly, western countries couldn’t secure their position in 
Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines and even Indonesia, the 
latter being very important in South-East Asian geopolitics. Therefore, the 
United States, as the leader of the anti-communist fight, had to act in order 
to protect the pro-West political group in Indonesia. The Indonesian Coup 
of September 1965 was an action meant to help the anti-communist group 
gain political power. The Indonesian Coup was strongly influenced by 
systemic factors, namely, the two great powers dominating the international 
politics22. Both had to protect and support their group, in accordance to the 
“Domino theory”.23   
                                                          
21 Peter Dale Scott, “The United States and Overthrow of Sukarno, 1965-1967,” Pacific 
Affairs, vol. 58, no. 2, Summer 1985, pp.239-264. 
22 Bruce M. Russet,  “The Asia Rim land as A Region for Containing China,” in 
Montgomery, J.D. & Hirschman, A.O., Public Policy, vol. 16, 1967, Massachusset, 
Harvard University Press, pp. 226-249. 
23 Mohd Noor Mat Yazid, “Economic Development, Hegemonic Powers and Indonesia-
Malaysia Political Relations,” (Unpublished Ph.D thesis, School of Social Sciences, The 
University of Birmingham, England, October 2004), pp. 369-370. 





When the Indonesian domestic policy changed after 1965 (the anti-
communists gained power in Indonesia), bilateral relations followed this 
development, because Malaysia was a pro-Western and anti-communist 
state. All the anti-communist states in South-East Asia decided to cooperate 
in order to form a regional organization meant to strengthen their position. 
The creation of Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 
August 1967 was also seen as a strategy of the democratic states in South-
East Asia for consolidating their position in the international arena. The 
strong support from the United States in the formation of ASEAN is 
notable. Without their help, it would have been impossible for ASEAN to 
survive and achieve their objective, especially in the early years after 
formation. There was a close relationship between the bipolar structure, 
systemic and domestic factors and the role of regional association in the 
changes of Indonesia-Malaysia bilateral relations.24 
 
Bipolar Structure, Systemic and Domestic Factors in the Indonesia-
Malaysia Bilateral Relations 
 
The changes within Indonesian domestic politics (mainly the new order) 
were the key factors determining the harmonious relations with Malaysia 
after 1965. But how did the changes in the Indonesian politics occur? Who 
was responsible for the changes from the “old order” under Sukarno to the 
                                                          
24Anthony McGrew, Christopher Brook (eds.), Asia Pacific in The New World Order, 
London & New York: Routledge, 1998, and see also Michael Leifer, ASEAN and The 
Security of South-East Asia, London, Routledge, 1989, pp. 24-25. 




“new order” under Suharto? We cannot solely explain the changes in 
Indonesian domestic politics by referring only to internal affairs. This is 
mainly because internal affairs were closely connected to the systemic, 
regional and international political structure.25 The changes within domestic 
politics weren’t to occur without US international assistance. Why has the 
US supported the anti-communist group in Indonesian politics? The 
struggle for power and political development in South-East Asia and Asia 
Pacific in mid-1960s influenced the Americans to help anti-communist 
groups as a consequence of the international bipolar structure.26 The 
American decision in Indonesian politics was to create a secure anti-
communist government in Indonesia and secure their sphere of influence in 




Given the bipolar structure of the Cold War, systemic factors led to 
the formation of Malaysian Federation in September 1963. The bilateral 
relation between Indonesia and Malaysia changed after April 1967 as a 
result of the internal political developments, namely the Indonesian Coup of 
1965. As demonstrated in the paper, the Western powers and especially the 
US played a significant role in influencing the domestic political changes in 
                                                          
25 Mohd Noor Mat Yazid, “Economic Development, Hegemonic Powers and Indonesia-
Malaysia Political Relations,” pp. 369-380. 
26 John Subritzky,  Confronting Sukarno: British, American, Australian and New Zealand 
Diplomacy in the Malaysian-Indonesian Confrontation, 1961-65, London, Macmillan 
Press Ltd, 2000, pp. 17-40. 





Indonesia. The path chosen by the Indonesian government was to foster 
foreign diplomatic relations with Malaysia. Also, the United States’ 
involvement in Indonesia can be seen as a part of their strategy in 
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